From eo12 Mon Jun 09 21:29:18 1997 Path: newsstand.cit.cornell.edu!news.tc.cornell.edu!news3.cac.psu.edu!howland.erols.net!newsxfer3.itd.umich.edu!news1.best.com!kerberos.ediacara.org!there.is.no.cabal From: wilkins Newsgroups: talk.origins Subject: [Draft FAQ] Evolution and Philosophy Part 3 Date: 4 Jun 1997 20:16:03 -0400 Organization: Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research Lines: 650 Approved: robomod@ediacara.org Message-ID: NNTP-Posting-Host: kerberos.ediacara.org Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Newsreader: Yet Another NewsWatcher 2.4.0 X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by wehid.wehi.EDU.AU id KAA26763 The final of the above. =0C =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D Does evolution make might, right? Summary: evolution does not have moral consequences, and does not make cosmic purpose impossible. A number of critics see the use of selection theory in other than biological contexts as forcing malign political and moral commitments. A prime example of this is sociobiology, which is supposed to result in such things as eugenics, racism, and the death of the welfare state. Sociobiology, and the more recent evolutionary psychology movement, seeks to explain human behaviour in terms of the adaptations of human evolution. Gould especially has been vitriolic in his attacks on sociobiological explanations. It is thought by some to result in a completely selfish ethic known as rational egoism. Another such view is "Social Darwinism", which holds that social policy should allow the weak and unfit to fail and die, and that this is not only good policy but morally right. The only real connection between Darwinism and Social Darwinism is the name. The real source of Social Darwinism is Herbert Spencer and the tradition going back to Hobbes via Malthus, not Darwin's own writings, though Darwin gained some inspiration on the effects of population growth from Malthus. The claims made by Social Darwinists and their heirs suffer from the ethical fallacy known as "the naturalistic fallacy" (no connection to naturalism in explanations and the study of knowledge mentioned above). This is the inference from what may be the case to the conclusion that it is therefore right. However, while it is certainly true that, for example, some families are prone to suffer diabetes, as mine is, there is no licence to conclude that they should not be treated, any more than the fact that a child has a broken arm from a bicycle accident implies that the child should have a broken arm. David Hume long ago showed that "is" does not imply "ought". In fact, diverse political and religious opinions characterise social musings based upon evolutionary biology. For example, the 19th century Russian anarchist aristocrat Pyotr Kropotkin wrote a book called Mutual Aid [1902, cf Gould 1992] in which he argued that evolution results more in cooperation than it does in harsh competition. His views are echoed in recent use of games theory to show that, in some cases at least, cooperation is a stable strategy for certain populations to adopt [Axelrod 1984]. Evolutionary theory doesn't exclude Purpose from Life, although it does remove the need for purposive design from a lot of the living realm (ie, all but the genetically engineered bit of the living realm). This apparent confusion is resolved if we ask of evolutionary theory two questions: one, is there a design evident in the structure of living organisms? Two, is there a universal purpose to life in general? Science answers No to the first question. Design is not directly evident in living things, although there is a marvellous complexity and adaptivity of life to its environment. To the second question, science of any kind answers: Insufficient Information. That kind of answer you get elsewhere. =0C=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D Is evolution just another religion? Summary: Evolutionary theory is a scientific theory dealing with scientific data, not a system of metaphysical beliefs or a religion. It does, however, set the sorts of general problems biology deals with, and also acts as a philosophical attitude in dealing with complex change. Some claim that evolution is a metaphysic equivalent to a religion. To attack evolution, these critics feel the need to present it not as just a scientific theory, but as a world view that competes with the world views of the objectors. For example: "When we discuss creation/evolution, we are talking about beliefs: i.e. religion. The controversy is not religion versus science, it is religion versus religion, and the science of one religion versus the science of another." [Ham, K: 1983. The relevance of creation. Casebook II, Ex Nihilo 6(2):2, cited in Selkirk and Burrows 1987:3] "It is crucial for creationists that they convince their audience that evolution is not scientific, because both sides agree that creationism is not." [Miller 1982: 4, cited in Selkirk and Burrows 1987: 103] Metaphysics is the name given to a branch of philosophical thought that deals with issues of the fundamental nature of reality and what is beyond experience. It literally means "after the physics", so-named because Aristotle's book on the subject followed his Physics, which dealing with the nature of the ordinary world, which in Classical Greek is physike . It is defined in the 1994 Webster's as "a division of philosophy that is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and being and that includes ontology, cosmology, and often epistemology: ontology: abstract philosophical studies: a study of what is outside objective experience". Metaphysical systems come in three main flavors: philosophical systems (overall systems such as Kant's or Hegel's, or more recently Whitehead's or Collingwood's); ideologies , which are usually political, moral or other practical philosophical systems; and religions which in their theologies attempt to create comprehensive philosophical structures. A metaphysic is often derived from first principles by logical analysis. Aristotle, for example, started with an analysis of "being" and "becoming" (ie, what is and how it changes); Kant, with an analysis of knowledge of the external world; Hegel, from an analysis of historical change. Religious metaphysics often attempt to marry a philosophical system with basic theses about the nature and purpose of God, derived from an authoritative scripture or revelation. In some traditions, metaphysics is seen to be a Bad Thing, especially in those views sometimes called "modernisms". The great 18th century Scottish philosopher Hume once wrote that any book not containing reasoning by number or matters of fact was mere sophistry and should be consigned to the flames (he exempted his own philosophical writings, apparently). This distaste stems from the excesses of the medieval Scholastics, whose often empty formalism was applied to Aquinas' theology based on Aristotle's metaphysics. Early science arose in part from the rejection of this vapid quibbling. No-one can deny that views such as Luther's and Marx's rely upon metaphysical assumptions and methods. If views like these come into conflict with science, then there are four options: change the science to suit the metaphysics; change the metaphysics to suit the science; change both to fit each other; or find a place for the metaphysics in a "gap" where science hasn't yet gone. The last option is called the "God of the Gaps" approach [Flew and McIntyre 1955], and of course it has the disadvantage that if (when) science does explain that phenomenon, the religion is diminished. Historically, evolutionary science grew out partly from natural theology such as Paley's and Chambers' arguments from design, which defined the problems of biology in the early 19th century [Ruse 1979: chapter 3]. These writers sought evidence of God in the appearance of design in the natural world, yet, only a century later, when the evolutionary biologist JBS Haldane was asked what biology taught of the nature of God, he is reported to have replied "He has an inordinate fondness for beetles", since there were so many species of beetle. Other than that, he couldn't really say. Evolutionary science removed the ground from underneath natural theology. Arguments from design for the existence of God were no longer the only conclusion that could be drawn from the adaption of living things [Dennett 1995]. All the furore generated about the nature of chance in evolution is based not upon challenges to the scientific nature of the theory, but upon the need to find purpose in every facet of reality [cf Dennett 1995]. Often, this comes from religious conviction, but sometimes it arises from a more abstracted philosophical view. Metaphysical theories tend to fall into two kinds: those that view everything in nature as the result of Mind (idealisms) and those that view Mind as the result of mechanisms of Nature (naturalisms). One may take a naturalistic approach to some things, and still be an idealist in other domains; for example, one may accept with equanimity that minds are the result of certain sorts of physical brains and still consider, say, society or morality to be the result of the workings of Mind. Typically, though, idealism and naturalism are held as distinct and separate philosophical doctrines. Idealists, including creationists, cannot accept the view that reality cares little for the aspirations, goals, moral principles, pain or pleasure of organisms, especially humans [cf. Dawkins 1995:132f]. There has to be a Purpose, they say and Evolution implies there is no Purpose. Therefore, they say that evolution is a metaphysical doctrine of the same type as, but opposed to, the sort of religious or philosophical position taken by the idealist. Worse, not only is it not science (because it's a metaphysic, you see), it's a pernicious doctrine because it denies Mind. Christian creationism may rest upon a literal interpretation of Christian scripture, but its motivation lies in the view that God's Mind (Will) lies directly behind all physical phenomena. Anything that occurs must take place because it is immediately part of God's plan; they believe that the physical world should, and does, provide proof of God's existence and goodness (extreme providentialism). Evolution, which shows the appearance of design does not imply design, is seen to undercut this eternal truth, and hence they argue that it must be false. In the particular (actual) demonology of fundamentalism, it follows as a corollary that evolution is the work of the devil and his minions. [note 11] Philosophers of science mostly conclude that science is metaphysics neutral, following the Catholic physicist Pierre Duhem [1914]. Science functions the same way for Hindus as for Catholics, for Frenchmen as for Americans, for communists as for democrats, allowing for localised variations that are ironed out after a while. However, science does indeed rule out various religious etiological myths (origin stories), and often forces the revision of historical and medical stories used in the mythology of a religion. And when cosmologies are given in ancient scriptures that involve solid heavens, elephants and scarab beetles, science shows them to be unqualifiedly false as descriptions of the physical world as it is observed. Science can rule out a metaphysical claim, then. Is evolutionary science therefore a metaphysical Weltanschauung (a nice pretentious German word meaning world-view)? I don't think so. Many things claimed by metaphysical views such as fundamentalist Christian biblical literalism are not themselves metaphysical claims. For example, the claim that the world is flat (if made by a religious text) is a matter of experiment and research, not first principles and revelation. If "by their fruits shall ye know them", false factual claims are evidence of bad science, not good religion. Many of those who do hold religious views take the approach that they get their religion from their scriptures and their science from the scientific literature and community. They therefore treat the factual claims made in those scriptures the same way they treat the metaphysical views of scientists: as not germane to the function of that source of knowledge [Berry 1988]. Does the fact that Stephen Jay Gould admits to learning Marxism at his father's knee or Richard Dawkins to being an atheist mean that evolution is either Marxist or atheistic (as so many immediately and fallaciously conclude)? Of course not.[note 12] If it were the case that personal views of scientists defined the results of scientific work, then the broad range of metaphysical views of practising scientists would mean that -- at the same time -- science was Christian, Hindu, Marxist and probably even animist, as well as agnostic or atheist. While some extreme cultural relativists do try to claim that science is no more than the sum of its cultural environments, this view fails to explain how it is that science gets such consistent results and acquires such broad agreement on matters of fact. Nevertheless, this does not stop idealists from sometimes disingenuously claiming that science is what you want (or "will") to make of it (see the section on the nature of science). There is a tradition in modern Western philosophy, dating at least from the Romantic philosophers of the 18th century, that treats overall theories of the natural world as self-contained and self-validating systems of belief that are beyond criticism from other such systems. Many Christian and some Jewish philosophers and theologians have claimed that Christianity (or any religion) is indeed a self-contained Weltanschauung, and that it is immune from attacks upon its claims by scientific research. This takes several forms. One theologian, Rudolph Bultmann, once said that even if Jesus' physical remains were found, Christianity (as he interpreted it) would still be true. Others hold that all of science is just a religion, in the sense that it is a self-contained belief system, and therefore it cannot objectively disprove or challenge the claims made by another system (ie, Christianity). This is the approach often taken by creationists. In the final analysis, this boils down to an "anti-science" prejudice, for science is not, in this sense, a metaphysical system. Since science is not a system of thought deduced from first principles (as are traditional metaphysical systems), and that it deals precisely with objective experience, science is not, nor is any theory of science, a true metaphysical system. However, the claim is sometimes, and more plausibly, made that evolutionary theory, along with some other scientific theories, functions as a kind of attitudinal metaphysical system [Ruse 1989]. It is (in my opinion, rightly) thought to influence the kinds of problems and solutions dealt with by science. There is no problem with this, since in order for a discipline to make any progress, the field of possible problems (essentially infinite, to use a malapropism) must be restricted to some set of plausible and viable research options. The theory of evolution as now consensually held acts to narrow the range and limit the duplication required. This is harmless, and is true of any field of science. Ruse also describes what he calls "metaphysical Darwinism" [Ruse 1992] (as opposed to "scientific Darwinism") which is indeed a metaphysical system akin to a worldview, and which has expressed itself in numerous extra-scientific philosophies, including Spencer's, Teilhard's, and Haeckel's, or even the quasi-mystical views of Julian Huxley. These must be held separate to the scientific theory, and are often in contradiction to the actual scientific models. Other than this, the "metaphysic" of evolution by selection is primarily a research-guiding mindset that has been extraordinarily fruitful where no others have been. However, as a metaphysic, evolutionary theory is fairly limited and poor. This is what should be true of a scientific theory; for the conclusions beyond the empirical evidence that can be conjectured is unlimited. Any theory that committed itself to a metaphysical conclusion as a logical inference would be almost certainly false. =0C=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D Evolution and Philosophy Bibliography Copyright =A9 1996, 1997 by John Wilkins This is intended to be a reading list. Introductory and review items are marked with an asterisk. The bibliographies in these will get you into the meat of the modern debate very quickly. Access to the journal Biology and Philosophy will help, too. -------- Axelrod, R: 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books. *Berry, RJ: 1988. God and Evolution: Creation, Evolution and the Bible, Hodder and Stoughton. By far the best discussion I know (from an orthodox Protestant perspective) of the development of creationism, its heretical nature, its antiscientific bent, and it includes a pretty good discussion of evolution, and the history of the science. Berry is a professor of genetics. Bonner, JT: 1988. The Evolution of Complexity by Means of Natural Selection, Princeton University Press. Bowler, PJ: 1983. The Eclipse of Darwinism: Antievolutionary Theories in the Decades Around 1900, Johns Hopkins. Dawkins, R: 1976. The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 1989. Dawkins, R: 1995. River Out of Eden, Weidenfeld and Nicholson. *Dawkins, R: 1996. Climbing Mount Improbable, Viking Press. An excellent treatment of the 'orthodox' synthetic view of the evolution of adaptation. Dawkins, R and Krebs, JR: 1979. Arms Races Within and Between Species. Proc. R Soc Lond B 205: 480-512. Dennett, D: 1995. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Allen Lane Press. *Depew, DJ and Weber, BH: 1995. Darwinism Evolving: Systems Dynamics and the Genealogy of Natural Selection, Bradford Books/MIT Press. A comprehensive history of Darwinism, philosophical and biological, and an introduction to the new systems dynamics and complexity theory views of evolution. The bibliography alone is worth the purchase. Dray, WH: 1957. Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford University Press. *Dray, WH, ed: 1966. Philosophical Analyisis and History, Harper and Row. A collection of the seminal essays on the application of Hempel's nomological-deductive model to history, which, by extension, is also relevant to the historical sciences like evolution and geology. Duhem, P: 1914. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press (English trans. 1954). Ereshefsky, M: 1991. The Semantic Approach to Evolutionary Theory. Biology and Philosophy 6: 59-80. Feyerabend, PK: 1970a. Consolations for the Specialist. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds I Lakatos and I Musgrave, Cambridge University Press. Feyerabend, PK: 1970b. Against Method. In Minnesota Studies in Philosophy, Vol 4 Feyerabend, PK: 1975. Against Method, Verso Editions. Flew, A and MacIntyre, A eds: 1955. New Essays in Philosophical Theology, SCM Press. Franklin, J: 1997. Stove's Anti-Darwinism. Philosophy 72: 133-136 Gayon, J: 1996. The Individuality of the Species: A Darwinian Theory? - from Buffon to Ghiselin, and back to Darwin. Biology and Philosophy 11: 215-244. Gould, SJ: 1989. Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History , Norton. Gould, SJ: 1992. Kropotkin was No Crackpot. Essay 13 in Bully for Brontosaurus , Penguin, p325. Gould, SJ: 1996. Full House, Harmony, published outside the US as Life's Grandeur: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, Random House. Gould, SJ, and Lewontin R: 1979. The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Program. Proc. R Soc Lond B 205:581-598. Ghiselin MT: 1975. A Radical Solution to the Species Problem. Systematic Zoology 23: 536-544. Griffiths, PE: 1996. The Historical Turn in the Study of Adaptation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47:511-532. Hull, D: 1974. The Philosophy of Biological Science, Prentice-Hall. Hull, D: 1976. Are Species Really Individuals? Systematic Zoology 25: 174-191. Hull, D: 1988. Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science, University of Chicago Press. Kuhn, TS: 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second edition 1970, University of Chicago Press. Kuhn, TS: 1970. Reflections on my Critics. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds I Lakatos and I Musgrave, Cambridge University Press. Kuhn, TS: 1972. Second Thoughts on Paradigms. In The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. F Suppe, University of Illinois Press, second edition 1977. Kripke, S: 1972. Naming and Necessity. In Semantics and Natural Language, ed D Davidson and G Harman, 253-355, Reidel. Lakatos, I: 1970. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds I Lakatos and I Musgrave, Cambridge University Press. Laudan, L: 1977. Progress and Its Problems, University of California Press. Lennox, JG: 1992 Teleology. In Keywords in Evolutionary Biology, eds EF Keller and EA Lloyd, Harvard University Press. Lurie, E: 1988. Louis Agassiz: A Life in Science, Johns Hopkins University Press. Masterman, M: 1970. The Nature of Paradigms. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds I Lakatos and I Musgrave, Cambridge University Press. Mayr, E: 1970. Populations, Species and Evolution, Harvard University Press. Mayr, E: 1982. The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance, Belknap Press/Harvard University Press. Mayr, E: 1988. Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist, Belknap Press/Harvard University Press. Miller, K: 1982. Answers to standard Creationist arguments, Creation/Evolution 3:1-13. Monod, J: 1972. Chance and Necessity, Collins. Nagel, E: 1961. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, Routledge and Kegan Paul. *Oldroyd, D: 1986. The Arch of Knowledge:An Introductory Study of the History of the Philosophy and Methodology of Science, Methuen. This is a readable and comprehensive introduction to the issues of epistemology over the last 2500 years. O'Grady, D and Brooks, D: 1988. Teleology and Biology. In Entropy, Information, and Evolution: New Perspectives on Physical and Biological Evolution, eds, BH Weber, DJ Depew, and JD Smith, MIT Press. *Panchen, AL: 1992. Classification, Evolution, and the Nature of Biology, Cambridge University Press. In addition to reviewing the problems of cladistics, taxonomy and classification, important in the question of species and their evolution, this has an excellent short review of the history of recent philosophy of science, relevant to evolution. Popper, K: 1976. Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography, Fontana Press. Putnam, H: 1975. Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press. Quine, WVO: 1969. Natural Kinds. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press. Ruse, M: 1979. The Darwinian Revolution: Science Red in Tooth and Claw, University of Chicago Press. Ruse, M: 1989. The Darwinian Paradigm: Essays on its History, Philosophy and Religious Implications, Routledge. Ruse, M: 1992. Darwinism. In E F Keller and E A Lloyd eds Keywords in Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University Press. Ruse, M: 1997. Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University press. Selkirk, DR and Burrows, FJ eds: 1987. Confronting Creationism: Defending Darwin, New South Wales University Press. *Sober, E: 1984. The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus, Bradford Books/MIT Press. The standard reference on the philosophical implications of natural selection. Sober, E: 1988. Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference , Bradford Books/MIT Press. *Sober, E, ed: 1994. Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn. An anthology of the most philosophically important papers on evolution, including many otherwise inaccessible ones. Stamos, J: 1996. Popper, Falsifiability, and Evolutionary Biology. Biology and Philosophy 11: 161-191. *Sterelny, K: 1995. Understanding Life: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Biology. Brit J Phil Sci 46: 155-183. The title says it all, really. A first class introduction to the state of play. Stove, D: 1995. Darwinian Fairytales, Avebury Press. Suppe, F, ed.: 1977. The Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Illinois Press, second edition. Vermeij, GJ: 1987. Evolution and Escalation: An Ecological History of Life, Princeton University Press. Weber, BH and Depew, DJ: 1996. Natural Selection and Self-Organization, Biology and Philosophy 11: 33-65. Williams, GC: 1966. Adaptation and Natural Selection, Princeton University Press, reissued with a new Introduction, 1996. Williams, GC: 1985. In Defence of Reductionism. In Oxford Studies in Evolutionary Biology , eds R Dawkins and M Ridley, Oxford University Press. Williams, GC: 1992. Natural Selection: Domains, Levels, and Challenges, Oxford University Press. =0C=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D Notes -------- 1. The article by Stamos [1996] is by far the best review of Popper's views on evolution, and I recommend finding it if you have access to an academic library. A recent criticism of 'Darwinism' by the philosopher David Stove (1996) rehearses the usual arguments and adds some new ones, but in my view it rests on a false notion of what modelling and prediction does in real science. See the section on predictions and explanation. See also Franklin's review (1997). -------- 2. For example, the dismissal of Darwin's theory by his mentor, astronomer William Herschel, as "the law of higgeldy-piggeldy' [cf Ruse 1979 : 248-249 ]. -------- 3. Although I can't imagine Karl Popper being young, ever. -------- 4. See the review in Panchen 1992 for a more detailed summary, and Oldroyd 1986 for an introduction to science and knowledge since Plato. -------- 5. This was the point of the 19th century creationist Louis Agassiz's "answer" to Darwinism: "If species do not exist at all, how can they vary? And if individuals alone exist, how can differences which may be observed among them prove the variability of species?" [Lurie 1988: 297] Agassiz was strongly influenced by the German Naturphilosophen school, founded by disciplies of Goethe. -------- 6. It is easy to confuse Aristotle's formalism with Plato's idealism. For Aristotle, the perfect dog would be a real dog. For Plato, it might not be a physical dog, and if it were, it would be perfect because it was the physical form of an ideal. -------- 7. Attributed to the physicist Ernest Lord Rutherford, who said "Science is divided into two categories, physics and stamp-collecting", in J.D. Bernal "The social function of science", cited in The Penguin dictionary of twentieth century quotations, J.M & M. J. Cohen, 1993. Thanks to Peter Lamb for this ref. -------- 8. It is often wrongly thought that Williams ruled group selection out. He didn't, and doesn't [cf Williams 1992]. -------- 9. Things really shouldn't use the term 'modern' in their title, for the synthesis is showing its age now. -------- 10. That's the term used at the time. Don't blame me for being sexist. -------- 11. Think I'm exaggerating? Try these: Morris, H.M. (1974) Scientific Creationism. Creation-life publishing, San Diego: "[Satan] then brought about man's fall with the same deception ("ye shall be as gods") and the long sad story of the outworking of human unbelief as centered in the grand delusion of evolution has been the result." (p. 76) "Jesus said: "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matthew 7:18). The evil fruit of the evolutionary philosophy is evidence enough of its evil root." (p. 186) Morris, H.M. (1975) The Troubled Waters of Evolution. Creation-life publishing, San Diego: "Satan himself is the originator of the concept of evolution." (p. 75) Thanks to Chris Nedin for these references. Peter Lamb has commented: "I disagree with this interpretation of Creationism. I read it as a belief that a particular literalist ... interpretation is God's Mind, and to hell with physical phenomena if they appear to contradict it." This may be true, but it is also a feature of many other ideologies, such as Lysenkoist Stalinism, some varieties of Thomist scholasticism, and certain types of environmentalism. But what undergirds creationist literalism is a prior commitment to the Word of God (in effect, the mind and will, or purpose, of God) which is why they deny observable phenomena. -------- 12. Note in passing, that Gould is not a Marxist, although there are a number of prominent evolutionary biologists who make no secret of being so. Also note that there are many liberal and conservative evolutionary biologists. Political affiliation does not specify what sorts of theoretical views one must have. Darwin was a Whig (middle-class liberal) while Huxley and Wallace were radicals. Spencer and Haeckel could only be called conservatives, and a number of Haeckel's views were influential in the rise of fascism. Yet these political views did not and do not determine agreement on matters of theoretical biology - conservatives (eg, Maynard Smith) and radicals (eg, Levins or Lewontin) can often agree against others of their 'kind'. -------- --=20 John Wilkins, Head of Communication Services, Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research [Remove .UNSPAM from header address] It is not enough to succeed. Friends must be seen to have failed. - Capot= e